CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS NOT VIOLATED
WHEN TRIAL COURTJUDGE PROHIBITS DEFENDANT FROM CONFERRING WITH COUNSEL DURING A FIFTEEN MINUTE RECESS
BETWEEN THE DIRECT AND CROSS EXAMINATION OF DEFEND-

ANT-Perry v. Leeke, 109

S. Ct. 594 (1989).

The sixth amendment is an indispensable safeguard to ensure a criminal defendant a fair trial.' Included in this fundamental right is an accused's right to have the assistance of counsel to
mount his defense. 2 Historically the right to counsel received a
very limited interpretation. 3 Indeed, prior to 1932 there was
nominal focus placed upon expanding the literal interpretation
of the sixth amendment.' However, over the past fifty years the
1 See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-40, at 1634 (2d
ed. 1988); Fellman, The Federal Right to Counsel in State Courts, 31 NEB. L. REV. 15
(1952) (defendant's right to counsel in criminal prosecutions in state court proceedings). This is the second article dealing with this issue. The first article in the
series can be found in 30 NEB. L. REV. 559 (1951). See also Brecher, The Sixth Amendment and the Right to Counsel, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1957-63 (1988) (discussing constitutional limitations of right to counsel).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
3 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
60 (1932). Recognition of a right to assistance of counsel dates back to 17th century English common law. Powell, 287 U.S. at 60. Historically, a defendant charged
with treason or a felony did not receive assistance from counsel unless he had specific legal questions. Id. In contrast, however, defendants in civil suits or those
charged with misdemeanors were afforded complete assistance of counsel. Id.
Consequently, this rule entitling aid of counsel in petty offenses and denying it in
serious crimes has been the subject of much criticism, resulting in the evolution of
this area of the law. Id. Many of the colonies did not accept this rule. Id. at 61.
Prior to adopting the federal Constitution, Maryland's constitution stated "[t]hat,
in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right.., to be allowed counsel ...
Id. Many other states had similar provisions in their constitutions. Id.
4 See W.M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-34 (1955)
(discussing application and development of the right to counsel). A few of the
Supreme Court's past decisions mentioned the issue of counsel. Anderson v. Tiest,
172 U.S. 24 (1898) (Court upheld the appointment of defense counsel by trial
judge, when judge severed trial of co-defendant because of a conflict of interest).
See also Urban v. United States, 46 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1931) (the attorney for one
of many co-defendants was not present throughout the impaneling of the jury, but
his recognition of the panel at his arrival eliminated any problems which might have
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right to assistance of counsel has undergone various stages of development leading to a more significant application. 5 Conversely, the decades of expansion have created concern as to the
limits and constitutional dimensions of the right to counsel, at
times resulting in judicial retreat. 6 Recently, the United States
Supreme Court signaled further retreat from liberal sixth amendment interpretation. In Perry v. Leeke, 7 the Supreme Court held
that an order by a state trial court judge prohibiting a defendant
from conferring with counsel during a fifteen minute break, between direct and cross examination, did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel.8
Donald Ray Perry was tried and convicted in a South Carolina state court for murder, kidnapping and sexual assault. 9 Evidence presented to the jury by a psychiatrist and a psychologist
indicated that Perry was slightly retarded, but basically non-viooccurred); Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 4 (1944) (defendant in a criminal case has the right at trial to be represented by
counsel).
5 For further clarification of the expansion see Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984) (Court held the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel and a defendant must prove he was deprived of a fair trial because
his attorney's work was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the outcome of
his defense); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (A court must analyze an
attorney's individual performance in deciding whether there has been a denial of an
effective assistance of counsel, except when the surrounding circumstances qualify
an assumption of ineffectiveness); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (automatic reversal of conviction because defendant's sixth amendment fight to counsel was violated when trial court forbid consultation between clients and counsel
during overnight recess); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (held that no
indigent misdemeanant could be imprisoned unless he had been appointed counsel); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (the sixth amendment guarantees
a defendant the right to counsel at any critical confrontation by the opposing party,
including corporal pre-trial proceedings where the outcome may likely determine
the results of the trial and where the absence of an attorney may significantly affect
the decision); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the right to counsel is
essential and fundamental to ensure a fair trial and is therefore made obligatory by
the fourteenth amendment upon the states); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71
n. 12 (1932) (holding due process requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant who is being prosecuted for a capital offense if he is "incapable, adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like").
6 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (due process
does not require appointment of counsel in each parental termination proceeding
where parent is indigent); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (no right to
appointed counsel in summary court-martial proceedings).
7 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
8 Id. at 602.
9 Id. at 596.

620

SETON HALL LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:618

lent.' 0 Perry took the witness stand in his own defense." At the
end of the direct examination, the trial judge called a fifteen minute break. 12 During this period, and without prior notice to
counsel, he forbade Perry to speak with anyone, specifically his
attorney.' 3 Upon resumption of the trial, Perry's attorney moved
for a mistrial. 14 Thejudge denied the motion on the basis that a
defendant should not be allowed any additional preparation
or
5
coaching immediately before the cross examination.1
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld
Perry's conviction. 16 The court stressed that a defendant would
not "normally confer" with an attorney during a short recess between direct and cross examination.' 7 Consequently, the United
10 Id. The experts asserted that Perry, who at that time was 21 years old, had
experienced learning disabilities and by the ninth grade had dropped out of school.
Id. at 606 n.6. He had an extremely immature personality and an I.Q. of 86. Id.
The experts stated that Perry frequently had trouble distinguishing reality from
fantasy. Id.
1Ild. at 596.
12 Id.
'3 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. The judge stated that Perry "was in a sense then a ward of the Court. He
was not entitled to be cured or assisted or helped approaching his cross examination." Id.
16 Id. See State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 299 S.E.2d 324 (1983).
17 Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 597 (1989). Relying on a strict construction of
"normally confer," the state supreme court distinguished Perry v. Leek from the
United States Supreme Court decision in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80
(1976), stating:
We attach significance to the words "normally confer." Normally, counsel is not permitted to confer with his defendant client between direct
examination and cross examination. Should counsel for a defendant,
after direct examination, request the judge to declare a recess so that he
might talk with his client before cross examination begins, the judge
would and should unhesitatingly deny the request.
Id. (quoting State v. Perry, 278 S.C. at 491-94, 299 S.E.2d at 325-26). The state
supreme court held that Geders was not applicable because that decision stressed
that a defendant normally would consult with his attorney at some point in an overnight recess. Id. at 596. The court also explained that "we do not deal with ...
limitations imposed in other circumstances." Id. (quoting Geders, 425 U.S. at 91).
Justice Ness avidly dissented. Id. at 597. He believed Geders should apply because a
defendant would "normally confer" with counsel during a short recess. Id. He
asserted that the fundamental rights at issue are far more important than deterring
an attorney from "coaching" his client during a fifteen minute break. Id. He
agreed with the decision set forth by the court in United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d
630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977), which stated that "the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is so fundamental that it should never be interfered
with for any length of time absent some compelling reason." Perry, 109 S. Ct. at
597 n.l. More specifically, Justice Ness maintained:
To allow defendants to be deprived of counsel during court-ordered re-
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States Supreme Court denied Perry's petition for certiorari.1 8
Over four years after his trial court conviction, and more
than two and one-half years subsequent to the denial of certiorari, Perry filed a petition to obtain a writ of habeas corpus.19
The federal district court held that the fundamental right to
counsel should not be interrupted for any reason without some
compelling interest.2 0 Accordingly, the court granted Perry a
writ of habeas corpus. 2 ' The court also held that it was not necessary to demonstrate prejudice when there has been a denial of
counsel in order to set aside the conviction. 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed
the district court decision. 2 ' The court of appeals believed the
cesses is to assume the worst of our system of criminal justice, i.e., that
defense lawyers will urge their clients to lie under oath. I am unwilling
to make so cynical an assumption, it being my belief that the vast majority of lawyers take seriously their ethical obligations as officers of the
court ....
"Even if that assumption is to be made, the Geders opinion
pointed out that opposing counsel and the trial judge are not without
weapons to combat the unethical lawyer. The prosecutor is free to
cross-examine concerning the extent of any coaching or the trial judge
may direct the examination to continue without interruption until completed. Additionally, as noted in Allen, a lawyer and client determined to
lie will likely invent and polish the story long before trial; thus, the State
benefits little from depriving a defendant of counsel during short recesses.
I think the Sixth Amendment right to counsel far outweighs the
negligible value of restricting that right for a few minutes during trial."
Id. (quoting Perry, 278 S.C. at 495-97, 299 S.E.2d at 327-28 (1983) (Ness, J.,
dissenting)).
18 461 U.S. 908 (1983).
19 Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837, 839 (4th Cir. 1987). "Habeas corpus" is defined as
[t]he name given to a variety of writs ... having for their object to bring
a party before a court or judge. The primary function of the writ is to
release from unlawful imprisonment. The office of the writ is not to
determine guilt or innocence, and only issue which it presents is
whether prisoner is restrained of his liberty by due process.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 638 (5th ed. 1979).
20 Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 597. The district court relied on the holding in United
States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630, 633-34 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908
(1977).

Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 597.
Id. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court formulated a
two prong test which a petitioner must satisfy in order to sustain an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 669. The petitioner must first prove that counsel's performance was insufficient, and then that this performance prejudiced the
outcome of his trial. Id. at 691-96. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365
(1986) (to succeed on an ineffectiveness of counsel claim, a defendant must prove
gross incompetence resulting in a prejudicial outcome of the trial).
23 Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 597 (1989). The court of appeals' conclusion was based on
21
22
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conviction should stand because, although there was a constitutional error, it was not prejudicial to the outcome of the trial.2 4
The court concluded that it was essential to establish that the
constitutional error had a prejudicial influence upon the outcome
of the case in order to automatically reverse the conviction. 5
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certio2 7
rari.2 6 The Court, after refusing to apply a prejudice analysis,
held that the trial court's order prohibiting the defendant from
conferring with his attorney during the short, mid-trial recess did
not violate the right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed in
28
the sixth amendment.
The right to counsel is embedded in explicit constitutional
language.2 The Perry Court supported its decision with precedent which dates back fifty years-one-quarter of the entire time
which the constitutional language has existed.30 Thus, one need
the belief that the holdings in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) hinted that this type of trial error
was not so fundamentally threatening to a fair trial to automatically reverse a conviction. Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 597.
24 Id. After reviewing the record, the court of appeals decided that the proof
against Perry was so "overwhelming," that there was no reason to believe that his
responses during the cross-examination would have changed if he had been permitted time to speak with his attorney during the short break. Id. (quoting Perry v.
Leeke, 832 F.2d 837, 843 (4th Cir. 1987)).
25 Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668 (1984)). Four judges dissented in the
Perry decision. Id.
26 108 S. Ct. 1269 (1989).
27 Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 599. The Court cited to Geders to express that, "[a]ctual or
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether ....
[was] not subject to
the kind of prejudice analysis that is appropriate in determining whether the quality
of a lawyer's performance itself has been constitutionally ineffective.... Thus, we
cannot accept the rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision." Id. at 600 (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692) (citations omitted).
28 Id. The Court distinguished between the constitutional rights of a defendant
and those of a witness:
The distinction rests instead on the fact that when a defendant becomes
a witness, he has no constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while
he is testifying. He has an absolute right to such consultation before he
begins to testify, but neither he nor his lawyer has a right to have the
testimony interrupted in order to give him the benefit of counsel's advice.
The reason for the rule is one that applies to all witnesses-not just
defendants.
Id.
29 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30 Id. On July 2, 1789, the sixth amendment was incorporated into the Bill of
Rights. W.M. BEANEY, supra note 4, at 23. The Bill of Rights recently celebrated its
200th birthday. See Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4, 7 (1944).
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only trace back to 1932, to Powell v. Alabama,3 ' to locate the historical genesis of this constitutional right in case law.
In Powell, seven black defendants were charged with the rape
of two white girls.3 2 The defendants were not allowed an adequate chance to acquire their own legal counsel or contact their
families.3 3 Prior to the trial, the judge appointed the entire membership of the bar to represent the defendant for purposes of arraignment.3 4 However, the court did not appoint a specific
attorney until the actual morning of the trial.3 5 The trial court
sentenced all seven defendants to death, with each of the three
separate trials concluded in one day.3 6
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, finding that in light of the capital consequences of the proceedings,
the court's failure to appoint counsel denied the defendants due
process of law. 37 The Court reasoned that this denial placed the
defendants in a perilous situation because the newly appointed
counsel was unfamiliar with the case. 3 ' Recognizing the funda287 U.S. 45 (1932). "The right to effective assistance of counsel emerged as a
corollary to the basic right to counsel in Powell v. Alabama." Smithburn & Springmann, Effective Assistance of Counsel.- In Quest of a Uniform Standard of Review, 17
31

WAKE FOREST L. REV.

497, 499 (1981).

Powell, 287 U.S. at 49, 51. At the state's request, the trial court tried the defendants in three severed groups. Id. at 49. Punishment for rape ranged from a
prison term of ten years to a death sentence. Id. at 50. Sentencing was left to the
discretion of the jury. Id.
33 Id. at 57-58.
34 Id. at 56. It was a matter of speculation or anticipation by the trial court
whether these attorneys would represent the defendants at the trial. Id. The Powell
Court pointed out that even if such an appointment of the entire bar had been
made for representation at trial, this would not have satisfied the sixth amendment
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 50.
37 Id. at 70-73. In refusing to extend its holding beyond the unique circumstances of this case, the Powell Court cautioned:
All that is necessary to decide . . . is that in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of
making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to
assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law ....
Id. at 71.
The Court opined that in failing to supply the defendant with an "effective
appointment of counsel," thus denying "effective aid in the preparation and trial of
the case," the lower court denied the defendants due process of law. Id.
38 Id. at 58. The court noted:
The defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile sentiment, haled back and forth under guard of soldiers, charged with an
atrocious crime regarded with especial horror in the community where
they were to be tried, were thus put in peril of their lives within a few
32
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mental character of this constitutional right, the Powell court held
that the defendants were denied any meaningful right to counsel
by the "proforma" representation they received.3 9
Ten years after Powell, in Betts v. Brady,40 the Court determined that it was not a denial of due process to fail to appoint
counsel in a state trial for robbery.4 ' In Betts, the defendant was
indicted for robbery.4 2 Due to a lack of funds, Betts requested
that counsel be appointed for his representation.4 3 The judge
denied his request, adhering to a local law which allowed appointed counsel only for murder and rape cases. 4 4 Betts received
a sentence of eight years in prison.4 5 The Betts Court held that
the right to counsel was limited to cases involving a capital offense4 6 or when "exceptional circumstances" were present.47
moments after counsel for the first time charged with any degree of responsibility began to represent them.
Id. at 57-58. See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (defendant who is
indigent is entitled to "reasonably competent" advice from appointed counsel);
Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 31, at 498-99 (discussing the lack of standard
to determine the effectiveness of appointed counsel).
39 Powell, 287 U.S. at 58. The Court concluded that:
[Diuring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against
these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until
the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not
have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much
entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.
Id. at 57. See also Note, The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in California:Adoption
of the Sixth Amendment "Reasonably Competent Attorney" Standard, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 53
(1980-81) [hereinafter Note, Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel] (discussing California's management of ineffective assistance of counsel claims past and present,
with an in-depth analysis of the recently developed reasonably competent attorney
test); Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel. A
New Look After United States v. DeCoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980) (examining
some major approaches to remedying the dilemma, and formulating standards for
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)
(six years after Powell, the right to assistance of counsel requirement applicable to
indigent defendants in capital cases was expanded to include all felony cases).
40 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
41 Id. at 471.
42 Id. at 456.
43 Id. at 456-57.
44 Id. at 457.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 471. The Betts Court failed to extend the holding in Powell to the states
via the fourteenth amendment. Id.
47 Id. See also Decker & Lorigan, Right To Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103, 104 n. 1 (1969) (citing Carnley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (illiteracy); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443
(1962) (habitual criminal); McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (complexity of
statute and nature of defense charged); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697
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This "exceptional circumstances" situation was often the basis
for overturning non-capital felony convictions.4 8
Over three decades passed before the Court again embarked
on further expansion of the scope of the sixth amendment. In
Gideon v. Wainwright,49 the state charged the defendant with
breaking and entering a poolroom with the ultimate intent to
commit a misdemeanor.50 This constituted a felony under Florida state law. 5 1 The defendant asked the court to appoint an attorney to represent him because he had no money.5 2 The court
denied Gideon's request for appointed counsel because the
crime committed was not a capital offense. 5 3 The defendant conducted his own defense, and the jury convicted him.5 4 He received a sentence of five years in a state prison. 55 The defendant
thereafter sought habeas corpus relief in the Florida Supreme
Court claiming that he had not been afforded the rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution.5 6
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the right to
(1960) (youth); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (youth, race, and minimal
education); Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956) (limited educational background); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954) (mental retardation); Palmer v.
Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951) (mentally abnormal); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S.
437 (1948) (youth); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (misconduct by court
officials); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (extent of defendant's prior experience with criminal proceedings); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947) (youth);
DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) (youth); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786
(1945) (complex legal questions)).
This exceptional circumstances situation often overturned non-capital felony
convictions. See Decker & Lorigan, supra, at 104 n. 12. Betts v. Brady was outmoded
viritually from the day it was decided. Id. at 104. In a concurring opinion in Gideon,
Justice Harlan wrote:
In noncapital cases, the "special circumstances" rule has continued to
exist in form while its substance has been substantially and steadily
eroded .... The Court has come to recognize ... that the mere exist-

ence of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial. In truth the Betts v.
Brady rule is no longer a reality.
Id. (Harlan, J. concurring) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350-51
(1963)).
48 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
50 Id. at 336.
51 Id. at 336-37.
52 Id. at 337.
53 Id. "Capital offense" is defined as "one in or for which death penalty may, but
need not necessarily, be imposed." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 189 (5th ed. 1979).
54 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
55 Id.
56 Id. The petitioner signed and prepared his own petition for habeas corpus.
Id. In his petition he declared, "I, Clarence Earl Gideon, claim that I was denied
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counsel in criminal cases was essential and fundamental to a fair
trial. 57 In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Black reasoned that the federally acknowledged right to assistance of
counsel for indigent defendants should be extended to state felony prosecutions.5 8 The decision in Gideon expressly overruled
Betts v. Brady.59
Four years after Gideon, in United States v. Wade,60 the
Supreme Court interpreted the sixth amendment right to counsel
to include pre-trial corporeal identification procedures. 6 ' In
the rights of the 4th, 5th and 14th amendments of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 337
n.1.
57 Id. at 344. Also commenting on the fundamental nature of the right, Justice
Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
58 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 331-44 (1963). See generally Note, Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel, supra note 39, at 58-60 (post-1963 treatment of state
criminal defendants under the Constitution).
59 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. The Gideon Court concluded that the Betts Court
wandered from the logical wisdom for which the Powell Court had rested. Id. While
a few states wanted Betts to remain good law, most states, in support of the Court,
believed that Betts was "an anachronism when handed down" and that it was time to
overrule it. Id.
60 388 U.S. 2.18 (1967).
61 Id. at 236-37. The sixth amendment right to counsel has been interpreted to
apply to all "critical" stages of trial proceedings. Id. at 224. The Wade Court noted
that the explicit language of this right includes counsel's assistance at all times that
are necessary to supply a meaningful "defence." Id. at 225. Further, the opinion
determined that the assistance of counsel should be supplied where particular
rights may be lost or sacrificed because "[wihat happens there may affect the whole
trial. Available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted
.... Id. (quoting
.
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961)). See also Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (failure by police to warn defendant of his constitutional right to remain silent, and denial of access to his counsel who was present
elsewhere in the building, violated defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment
rights); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (incriminating statements
made by the defendant should be inadmissible as evidence because, without any
notice to the defendant's attorney, federal agents set up a meeting between an informant and the defendant); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (due process
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Wade, a grand jury indicted the defendant for bank robbery and
conspiracy. 62 Without prior notice to counsel, Wade was placed
in a lineup, forced to put pieces of tape on his face as the robber
had supposedly done, and told to say words that the robber had
allegedly spoken.6" Two bank employees positively identified
Wade as the robber.64 At trial, the same bank employees again
identified Wade as the perpetrator.65 Wade's counsel moved to
strike the courtroom identifications as violative of the fifth and
sixth amendments.6 6 The trial court denied the motion and
Wade was ultimately convicted.67 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, and granted a new trial.68
Justice Brennan's majority opinion recognized that in a pretrial lineup there is certainly potential for prejudice to occur
which may not be able to be recaptured for review at trial.69 The
majority reasoned that because an attorney's presence can often
deter prejudice as well as add to the meaningfulness of the confrontation at trial, undoubtedly this post-indictment lineup was a
clause of fourteenth amendment violated when defendant entered guilty plea in
absence of attorney).
62 Wade, 388 U.S. at 220.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 221. At the new trial, it was ordered that the in-court identification not
be permitted as evidence because although Wade's fifth amendment rights were
not violated by the lineup, "the lineup, held as it was, in the absence of counsel,
already chosen to represent appellant, was a violation of his Sixth Amendment
rights ....
Id. (quoting Wade v. United States, 358 F.2d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1966)).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 385 U.S. 811 (1966).
69 Wade, 388 U.S. at 236. The majority further reasoned that lineups can be
inherently suggestive, intentionally or not, via the techniques used. Id. Justice
Brennan recognized that what occurs at the pre-trial identification may taint a later
in-court identification. Id. Cf. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (right to
counsel not applicable where witness views still or moving pictures of the suspect
for purposes of identification); Kirby v. Illinois 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel not extended to lineups occurring before the institution of formal proceedings
against the suspect); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (no sixth amendment right to counsel permitted where blood sample is taken from suspect). The
Wade Court differentiated such cases as not worthy of "critical stage" classification
because the
[k]nowledge of techniques of science and technology is sufficiently available, and the variables in techniques few enough that the accused has
the opportunity, for a meaningful confrontation of the government's
case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross examination of the
government's expert witnesses, and to presentation other evidence of
his own experts.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-28.
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critical stage for Wade; he was "as much entitled to such aid [of
counsel] . . .as at the trial itself."70 Therefore, Wade and his
attorney should have been informed about the lineup, and counsel should have been present unless waived by the defendant. 7
The Court determined that an accused is guaranteed the right to
counsel by the sixth amendment during any critical confrontation
by the prosecuting attorney, not just at the trial. 7 2 This includes
pre-trial proceedings where the outcome might play a part in the
accused's fate and where counsel's absence might diminish the
fairness of the trial. 7' The Supreme Court thus established a
bright line rule that any identification of this nature, occurring in
the absence of counsel, unless effectively waived, must be excluded as evidence at trial. 4
In 1972, the Court expanded the right of counsel to misdemeanor cases in Argersinger v. Hamlin. 75 In Argersinger, an indigent
defendant accused of carrying a concealed weapon, a crime
which carries a six-month maximum prison sentence and/or fine,
received a sentence of ninety days imprisonment.7 6 At trial, the
court did not appoint counsel to the defendant. 7 7 The Florida
Supreme Court held that the defendant had no right to assistance
of counsel because punishment was, at the maximum, only six
months. 78 The defendant claimed the court had failed to assist
him with his constitutional right to counsel. 79 The Argersinger
70

Id. at 237 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).

71 Id. See also Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (fourteenth amendment

due process guarantees illiterate defendant the assistance of counsel unless intelligently and knowingly waived); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver
is ordinarily considered a purposeful relinquishment or abnegation of an understood privilege or right).
72 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-26.
73 Id. At any pretrial confrontation procedure after indictment, a defendant has
an absolute right to counsel. Id. These confrontations include lineups as well as
one-man showups. Id. A lineup is a situation in which a witness picks the suspect
from a group of similarly looking individuals. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 189 (5th
ed. 1979). A one-man showup is a situation in which the witness sees only the
suspect and is asked whether he is the assailant. Id.
74 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224-26.
75 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
76 Id. at 26-27.
77 Id. at 26.
78 Id. at 27. This four to three decision by the Florida Supreme Court was based
on the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 159 (1968), which dealt with the right to trial by jury. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at
27. The Duncan Court stated that only trials "for non-petty offenses punishable by
more than six months imprisonment," should have the right to a court appointed
attorney. Id.
79 Id. at 26. The defendant claimed that as an indigent layman, he did not have
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Court stated that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial."' 80 The Court determined that the right to
counsel extended to every indigent, misdemeanor defendant
subject to a potential jail sentence. 8 ' The Court stated that the
sixth amendment right to counsel should not be applied inconsistently to those charged with felonies and those charged with
misdemeaners.82

Four years after Argersinger, the Court again applied a liberal
interpretation of the sixth amendment in the seminal case of
Geders v. United States.8 3 In Geders, the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to import and illegal transportation of marijuana from
Columbia to the United States.84 The defendant testified on his
own behalf.8 5 After the conclusion of the defendant's direct examination, but before cross examination by the prosecution, the
court called an overnight recess.86 The judge, by request of the
prosecutor, forbade the defendant to speak with counsel at any
point throughout the recess.8 7 During the trial proceedings, the
same instructions had been given to all witnesses whose testimony was stopped temporarily for a recess.88 The defense attorthe ability to sufficiently represent himself against the charges for which he was
convicted, thus alleging an unconstitutional deprivation of his right to counsel. Id.
80 Id. at 37. The Court agreed with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Oregon in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Or. 94, 458 P.2d 414 (1969), where the court
stated:
We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been
denied the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecutions, including
prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The denial of the
assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail sentence.
Id. at 108, 458 P.2d at 418.
81 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
82 Id. See also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may not be used to augment a permissible sentence for a second
offense); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juveniles entitled to the right to appointed
counsel in a juvenile delinquency proceeding when there is the possibility of institutional commitment).
83 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
84 Id. at 81. More specifically, in the Middle District of Florida, a grand jury
indicted petitioner and many co-defendants for possession of marijuana, conspiracy
to import unlawful substances, and the illegal importation of a controlled substance
to the United States in violation of federal law. Id. at 81-82.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
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ney objected, but the judge upheld the bar order.8 9 The
defendant was later convicted. 90 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction. 9 ' The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari,92 and reversed, holding
that an order forbidding a defendant from conferring with his
attorney throughout a seventeen hour overnight break in between his direct and cross examination violated his sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel. 3
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion noted that a defendant would normally confer with counsel during a seventeen-hour
overnight recess.94 The majority also emphasized that they were
not addressing bar orders placed upon the defendant in other
circumstances. 95 Significantly, the Court acknowledged its unwillingness to determine whether the Geders holding would apply
to shorter periods than a seventeen-hour overnight recess, particularly in the case of a "brief routine recess during the trial
89 Id. Defendant's attorney claimed this was a deprivation of the right to assistance of counsel. Id. Counsel argued that he had a right to discuss other matters
with his client other than the immediate cross-examination. Id. The judge replied,
"Ithink he would understand it if I told him just not to talk to you; and Ijust think
it is better that he not talk to you about anything." Id.
90 Id. at 85. Petitioner was found guilty on all three counts. Id. For each count
he was sentenced to a three year prison term, which were to be served concurrently.
Id.
91 Id. at 85-86 (citing United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974)). Several
other claims of error had been disposed of by the court of appeals. Id. The court
determined that failing to show that the denial of access to counsel had prejudiced
his defense fatally affected his appeal. Id. (citing United States v. Leighton, 386
F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1025 (1968)) (defendant's right to
counsel was not violated by a trial court ruling that defendant could not speak with
his lawyer during a lunch break absent a showing of prejudice to the outcome of the
trial). Cf United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950) (not necessary to
prove prejudice in order to automatically reverse a conviction in case dealing with
bar order on an overnight break).
92 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
93 Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976). The case was reversed and
remanded to the court of appeals, with directions that it be further remanded to the
district court. Id. at 91-92.
94 Id. at 88. The majority noted that during an overnight recess, it is common
for an attorney and client to discuss the events which occurred during the trial, as
well as tactical decisions and new strategies. Id. The opinion further recognized
that new information, serious work, and other significant matters are discussed during an overnight period; the lawyer's guidance is therefore of great necessity to
ensure the defendant is well equipped to comprehend the trial process. Id. at 89
(citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-36 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
95 Id. at 91. Chief Justice Burger concluded: "We need not reach, and we do
not deal with, limitations imposed in other circumstances." Id.
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day." 9 6

In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall, with whom Justice
Brennan joined, further reasoned that the general principles of
this case should apply to a "brief routine recess."9 7 Justice Marshall stated that the general rule should be applicable to the analysis of all restrictions on defendant-counsel contact, at least
where the contact would not interrupt the contrivance and orderliness of the trial. 98 Justice Marshall also posited that any time a
defendant claims that his right to confer with counsel has been
infringed upon, no preliminary evidence of prejudice should be
necessary. 99 The concurring opinion concluded that orders of
this nature were inherently suspect, and a preliminary justification by the government should be required.' 00
The issue of a preliminary finding of prejudice requirement
was squarely dealt with in the two 1984 decisions of Strickland v.
Washington 101 and United States v. Cronic.10 2 The defendant in
Strickland pleaded guilty to an indictment containing three capital murder charges. 0 3 He informed the trial judge that his past
criminal history contained nothing more than some burglaries,
and that he was under a great deal of stress due to personal familial reasons. 104 The judge, affected by the defendant's confession, stated he had "a great deal of respect for people who are
10 5
willing to step forward and admit their responsibilities."'
Id. at 92.
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). More specifically, Justice Marshall stated: "I
would assume, however, that the Court's repeated reference to the length of the
overnight recess in this case-17 hours-is not intended to have any dispositive
significance, and that the Court's holding is at least broad enough to cover all overnight recesses." Id. at 92 n.l (Marshall, J., concurring).
96
97

98

Id.

99 Id.
100 Id. at 92-93 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall noted that the only
justification specifically dealt with by the Court was the avoidance of unethical
coaching by counsel. Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., concurring).
101 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
102 466 U.S. 649 (1984).
103 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672. In addition to the three counts of first degree
murder, defendant was to be charged with conspiracy to commit a robbery, multiple counts of robbery, kidnapping and ransom, attempted murder, breaking and
entering, and assault. Id. After waiving his right to a trial by jury, defendant
pleaded guilty to all charges, against his counsel's advice. Id. Additionally, the defendant decided to be sentenced by the trial judge independent of a jury recommendation. Id.
104 Id. In addition, defendant told the trial judge that "he accepted responsibility
for the crimes." Id.
105 Id. The judge also noted that he was not making any determinations as to
how he would sentence the defendant. Id.
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While preparing for the sentencing hearings, the defense attorney neglected to obtain a psychiatric examination or attempt to
locate any character witnesses. 0 6 The trial judge found many aggravating circumstances 10 7 and absolutely no mitigating circumstances surrounding the murder in the pre-sentencing
hearing. 08 The court thus sentenced the defendant to death on
all three murder counts.' 0 9 On appeal, the defendant claimed
that counsel had been ineffective in neglecting to present any
mitigating circumstances.' 10
After the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court decision, the defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus petition claiming, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel."' Ultimately, the
United States Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction, determined that an inquiry into whether the claimed violation of effective assistance of counsel was valid required a preliminary
prejudice analysis. 1 2 The Strickland Court ruled that in order to
obtain automatic reversal, a defendant must show that his coun106
107

Id.
108

Id. at 673.
Id. at 674. More specifically, the trial judge found that
all three murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, all involving repeated stabbings. All three murders were committed in the
course of at least one other dangerous and violent felony, and since all
involved robbery, the murders were for pecuniary gain. All three were
committed to avoid arrest for the accompanying crimes and to hinder
law enforcement. In the course of one of the murders, respondent
knowingly subjected numerous persons to a grave risk of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting the murder victim's sister-in-law, who sustained severe-in one case, ultimately fatal-injuries.
Id. at 674-75.

109 Id. at 675. Defendant was sentenced to prison terms for the other offenses.

Id.
110 Id.
'''
Id. at 678.
112 Id. at 700. The Court stated:
Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or
sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. Here there is a
double failure . . . respondent has made no showing that the justice of
his sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary
process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance. Respondent's
sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally unfair. We conclude,
therefore, that the District Court properly declined to issue a writ of
habeas corpus. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
reversed.
Id. at 700-01. See generally Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 31, at 508-09 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)) (in a particular case, some constitutional errors may be so trivial and insignificant that they may, commensurate
with the federal Constitution be considered harmless error, not mandating automatic reversal).
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sel's demeanor was so detrimental that it biased his defense." t3
Building upon the Strickland decision, United States v. Cronic 4
reaffirmed the necessity of a prejudice analysis to automatically
reverse a sixth amendment right to counsel violation. 1 5 In Cronic
the defendant and two associates were charged with mail fraud as
a result of their involvement in a "check kiting" scheme in which
checks were transported between a Florida bank and an
Oklahoma bank. 1 6 The government had been preparing their
case for approximately four and a half years. 1 7 The defendant's
attorney withdrew from the case causing the court to appoint a
new attorney with little experience in this area of litigation." 8
The new attorney had only twenty-five days to prepare his
case.'
The court ultimately convicted the defendant. 120 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed
the conviction based on the fact that because the defendant's
sixth amendment right to counsel was violated, no showing of
prejudice was necessary "when circumstances hamper a given
lawyer's preparation of a defendant's case." 121
Justice Stevens, author of the majority opinion, stated that
"[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is ...the right
of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."1 22 The majority held
113 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. The two pronged test developed in Strickland required first a showing of deficient performance by counsel, and second, that this
performance was prejudicial to the defendant's defense, in order to sustain a sixth
amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim. Id
114 466 U.S. 649 (1984).

115

Id.

Id. A transfer of more than $9,400,000 in checks was involved. Id.
Id. The government had reviewed thousands of documents and had conducted intensive investigations in preparation for trial. Id.
118 Id. The court appointed a young real estate attorney. Id.
116
117

119
120
121

Id.

Id. at 650.

Id. (quoting United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982)).
The court of appeals reversed the conviction based on the inference that defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had not been satisfied. Id. at 652. Five criteria were used in coming to this conclusion: "(1) [T]he
time afforded for investigation and preparation; (2) the experience of counsel; (3)
the gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel." Id. (quoting United States v. Golub, 638 F.2d 185,
189 (10th Cir. 1980)).
122 Id. at 656-57. Justice Stevens asserted: "When a true adversarial criminal trial
has been conducted-even if defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors-the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if
the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated." Id. See also id. at 657 n.21 (counsel's performance is
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that the critical factor in determining whether the right to effective assistance of counsel has been satisfied is whether the defendant received a fair trial.' 2 3 The Court concluded that unless
the defendant can show that some action or inaction by his attorney prejudiced the outcome of 1the
trial, the sixth amendment
24
generally would not be violated.

The past fifty years of sixth amendment precedent reveals
the Court's struggle to define the parameters of, and limitations
upon, the rights to appointed and effective assistance of counsel. 125 The Court's prerequisite of a demonstration of prejudice,
coupled with its "critical stage" charaterization, suggests an attempt to limit the expansion of such rights.' 2 6 With this historical perspective as a backdrop, and in a continued effort to define
the boundaries of the sixth
amendment, the Court delivered its
1 27
opinion in Perry v. Leeke.

Justice Stevens, writing for the Perry majority, first analyzed
the necessity of establishing prejudice in order for the Geder's rule
to apply. 2 8 The majority distinguished between cases where the
government directly interferes with the right to counsel and cases
where an attorney's performance is lacking in some essential
focus, not clients perception of performance or relationship between attorney-client); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (counsel not constitutionally required to
raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by a defendant, if in his professional discretion, he decides not to raise those issues); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (a
"meaningful attorney-client relationship" is not guaranteed by the sixth
amendment).
123 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 649, 658 (1984).
124 Id. Cronic explicitly stated that in certain situations prejudice may be presumed and per se reversal is appropriate. Id. The Cronic Court reasoned:
There are ... circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused
that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.
Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel. The
presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical
stage of his trial.
Id. (footnote omitted). Further, the Cronic majority recognized that the "Court has
uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding." Id. at 659 n.25.
125 See supra notes 32-124 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., supra notes 60-74, 101-113 and accompanying text (discussing Wade
and Strickland).
127 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
128 Id. at 599. In Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), the Court granted
automatic reversal without considering whether actual prejudice resulted from the
defendant's denial of counsel throughout the seventeen hour overnight recess. See
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quality or element so as to render it ineffective. 2 9 The Court
expressed "that direct governmental interference with the right
to counsel is a different matter."'13 ' Accordingly, the Court rejected the appellate court's belief that Strickland required applica31
tion of a prejudice analysis in this context.'
A number of rationales were set forth by the Court in support of its contention that the Geder's rule did not apply to a fifteen minute recess. 13 2 The majority first distinguished Perry from
Geders on constitutional grounds.' 33 Justice Stevens emphasized
that before a defendant testifies he has a constitutional right to
confer with counsel, but once he becomes a witness, he loses this
34
fundamental right. 1
The majority further distinguished Perry, relying on the content of a discussion in a fifteen minute break, as opposed to a
seventeen-hour overnight recess. 1 35 The Court stated that it was
normal during an overnight recess to discuss trial-related matters
other than the defendant's testimony. 136 Justice Stevens pointed
out that the defendant is constitutionally guaranteed the right to
discuss these other matters with counsel at any time. 1 37 AlternaPerry, 109 S. Ct. at 599. The Court stated:
Our citation of Geders in this context was intended to make clear that
"[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether
... is not subject to the kind of prejudice analysis that is appropriate in
determining whether the quality of a lawyer's performance itself has
been constitutionally ineffective."
Id. at 600 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)) (citations
omitted).
130 Id. at 599.
131 Id. at 600.
132 Id.
133 Id. More specifically, Justice Stevens stated: "Admittedly the line between
the facts of Geders and the facts of this case is a thin one. It is, however, a line of
constitutional dimension. Moreover ....
it is not one that rests on an assumption
that trial counsel will engage in unethical 'coaching.' " Id.
134 Id. The majority recognized that it is not uncommon for a judge to sequester
a witness until the trial is over in order to obtain truthful statements, uninfluenced
by what the other witnesses may be saying. Id. See also id. at n.4 (illustration and
discussion of sequestration orders). The Pery Court stated that the constitutional
right of the defendant to cross examine the witnesses makes him immune from this
type of physical sequestration. Id. at 600. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI, ("In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him .... "); see generally 6J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1837-38 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976 and Supp. 1988) (discussing sequestration of witness); FED. R. OF EVID. 615 (discussing exclusion of witnesses).
135 Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 602 (1989).
136 Id. The Court inferred that the attorney and client may want to discuss the
accessibility of new witnesses, trial strategies, or a possible plea bargain. Id.
137 Id. Furthermore, the Court maintained: "[W]e do not believe the defendant
129
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tively, during a short recess, the Court presumed that only the
testimony of the defendant would be discussed. 38 The Court
stressed that the defendant has no constitutional right to discuss
his own testimony with counsel during a break between his direct

3 9
and cross examination.1
The Court next addressed the need to maintain the "status
quo" during a short recess.' 40 The majority asserted that ajudge
must be given the discretionary power necessary to preserve the

effectiveness of the trial process.' 4 ' Justice Stevens concluded
that it was very probable that any discussion between the attorney and his client in the middle of the trial would relate to the
defendant's current testimony. 142
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that if time
were allowed during a brief recess for a defendant to speak with
counsel, the "truth-seeking function of the trial" may be frustrated. 4 3 Justice Stevens argued that the spontaneity of the defendant's answer was the key to finding truth. 1 44 Accordingly,
the majority reasoned that a defendant's answers would be unduly influenced by a mid-trial consultation. 4 The Court feared
has a constitutional right to discuss that testimony while it is in process." Id. at
601-02.
138 Id. at 602.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 601. The Court explained:
Cross-examination often depends for its effectiveness on the ability of
counsel to punch holes in a witness' testimony at just the right time, in
just the right way. Permitting a witness, including a criminal defendant,
to consult with counsel after direct examination but before cross-examination, grants the witness an opportunity to regroup and regain a poise
and sense of strategy that the unaided witness would not possess.
Id.
141 Id. at 602.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 601.
144 See id. at 601 n.7. Justice Mishler in an earlier opinion reasoned:
The age-old tool for ferreting out truth in the trial process is the right to
cross-examination .... The Court has consistently acknowledged the
vital role of cross-examination in the search for truth. It has recognized
that the defendant's decision to take the stand, and to testify on his own
behalf, places into question his credibility as a witness and that the prosecution has the right to test his credibility on cross-examination.
Id. (quoting United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mishler,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982)). Cf.5J. WIGMORE, supra note 134,
at § 1367 (referring to cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
145 Perry v. Leeke, 109 S.Ct. 594, 601 (1989). The Court cautioned that this
conclusion was not meant to insist upon prohibiting a client from conferring with
counsel during a short recess. Id. at 602. Rather, Justice Stevens noted that it is a
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that new strategies, as well as "unethical coaching," were likely to

result, and that both would interfere with the effectiveness of the
46
cross examination. 1
Concurring in part, and dissenting in part, Justice Kennedy
agreed with the majority's holding that there was no sixth
14 7
amendment deprivation of the right to assistance of counsel.
Justice Kennedy, however, felt it was irrelevant to discuss the issue of prejudice when the constitutional right to counsel had
48
been refused. 1
In a puissant dissent, Justice Marshall denounced the majority's distinction between the right to counsel during a long recess
and during a short recess. 149 Justice Marshall asserted that this
distinction was illogical and had no constitutional basis.'5 0 The
dissent criticized the majority's failure to deal with the true issue. 15 ' According to the dissent, the Court granted certiorari on
the issue of whether a prejudice analysis was necessary to automatically reverse a denial of the right to counsel.' 5 2 Justice Marshall pointed out that rather than dealing with the significant
issue of the constitutional deprivation of a fundamental right, the
majority determined that the complete barring of access between
an attorney and a defendant was legitimate because it supported

fact specific decision to be determined at the discretion of the particular judge, or
in some cases statutes may permit consultation as a matter of law. Id. The Perry
Court stated that another possibility would be for the judge to permit a defendant
and counsel to confer during a brief recess but prohibit discussion of the current
testimony. Id. at 602 n.8.
146 Id. at 602. Justice Stevens reasoned that "[o]nce the defendant places himself
at the very heart of the trial process, it only comports with basic fairness that the
story presented on direct is measured for its accuracy and completeness by uninfluenced testimony on cross-examination." Id. at 601 (quoting DiLapi, 651 F.2d at
151 (Mishler, J., concurring)).
147 Id. at 602 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 602 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun
joined in the dissent. Id. Compare Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (automatic reversal of conviction because defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel was violated when trial court forbid consultation between client and counsel
during overnight recess), with Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989) (no violation of
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel when trial court judge forbade consultation with counsel during a brief afternoon recess).
150 Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 602 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Diametrically opposed to the
majority's holding, Justice Marshall argued that the sixth amendment precluded
"any order barring communication between a defendant and his attorney, at least
where that communication would not interfere with the orderly and expeditious
progress of the trial." Id. (quoting Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 92 (1976)
(Marshall, J., concurring)) (emphasis in original).
151 Id. at 603 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152

Id.

638

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:618

the "truth seeking function" of the trial.'
The dissent's argument focused on precedent and history.' 54
Justice Marshall asserted that prior holdings illustrated that any
bar on an attorney-defendant contact, regardless of the amount
of time involved, was not permissible. 55 The Justice also noted
that the sixth amendment does not allow any prohibition of attorney-defendant contact, particularly where such contact would not
impede the normal functioning of the trial process.' 56 Justice
Marshall pointed out that the majority declined to mention the
long line of cases which state that the defendant has the right to
confer with
counsel at every important step of the trial
57
process.'

The dissent next questioned the majority's contention that a
defendant loses his constitutional right to counsel when testifying.' 58 Justice Marshall found this argument to be totally irrelevant. 15 The dissent emphasized that the question in this case
was whether a defendant had the right to confer with counsel "af153 Id.
154 Id. at 602-03 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 603 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Sanders v. Lane, 861 F.2d 1033

(7th Cir. 1988) (restriction on attorney-client contact during a lunchtime recess is a
violation of defendant's right to counsel without necessity to show prejudice, but
error held to be harmless); Bova v. Dugger, 858 F.2d 1539 (11 th Cir. 1988) (violation of defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel occurred when state murder
defendant was denied right to confer with counsel during a fifteen minute break
called in the midst of defendant's cross-examination); Crutchfield v. Wainwright,
803 F.2d 1103 (11 th Cir. 1988) (defense must show, on record, the desire to confer
in order to maintain a deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel
claim); Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1510-14 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (trial
court's order forbidding defendant to confer with counsel throughout a weekend
trial recess, even though restriction was limited to testimonial discussion, was a
deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel and a showing of actual
prejudice was required in order to automatically reverse conviction); Stubbs v.
Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982) (required defendant to prove that he
wanted to confer with counsel, and would have done so but for the bar order by the
trial judge), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983); United States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641
(5th Cir. 1980) (trial court's order not to discuss the case with counsel throughout a
lunch break called during a defendant's cross-examination denied defendant effective assistance of counsel); United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976)
(restriction on client-counsel contact during a one-hour recess in the middle of direct testimony is a deprivation of defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel);
United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976) (automatic reversal for restriction on attorney client contact during short routine break is not constitutionally
permissible regardless of whether any prejudice occurred which affected outcome
of trial), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977).
156 Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 603 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'57 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 604 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ter" a recess had been called by the judge, for some reason other
than the desire of the attorney and the defendant to communicate.' 60 The Perry dissent stressed that the issue was not whether
the defendant had the "right to interrupt the trial."' 16 1 It was the
adequacy of the belief, according to Justice Marshall, that one
may confer
with one's attorney if such an interruption did
2
6

occur. 1

Justice Marshall observed that the majority referred to a general rule which forbids an attorney to make contact with a witness
between the direct and cross examination. 163 The premise for
this rule, according to the majority, was based on the belief that
the cross examination was more likely to produce truthful testimony if the witness was not given the chance to speak with third
parties. 64 Justice Marshall maintained that this general rule had
no authority.' 65 The dissent observed that evidence of the inconsistent application of the general rule was apparent in the case at
bar. 166 Justice Marshall noted three occasions where recesses
were called during the testimonies of state witnesses. 167 Justice
Marshall further emphasized that no bar orders were issued during any of these recesses, thus allowing the state witnesses to
160 Id. at 603 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Perry did not suggest he had a right to
interrupt in order to obtain the benefit of conferring with counsel, nor did he seek
to do so. Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. The dissent reasoned:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.... [A defendant] is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [may] have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step of
the proceedings against him.
Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
163 Id. at 604 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164 Id. The Court characterized the procedure of prohibiting lawyers or defendants to interrupt testimony, as analogous to the sequestration of witnesses. Id. See
also supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing witness sequestration). Justice Marshall pointed out that the majority goes so far as to list a long line of cases
explaining the reasons for witness sequestration. Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 604 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). The dissent stated, however, that the majority's logic was flawed in
that sequestration rules do not apply to defendants. Id. See also id. at 605 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (distinguishing defendant's cross-examination from a nonparty's). The dissent noted that the sixth amendment entitles the defendant to confront any witness that is testifying against him. See id. at 605 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 604 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167 Id. Of the three recesses, two were called towards the end of the direct testimony, but prior to the cross-examination. Id.
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confer with anyone. 68 According to the dissent, the majority
stretched this general rule beyond its constitutional dimensions. 16 Justice Marshall concluded that the majority overlooked
the distinction between the rights guaranteed to a defendant, and
those not guaranteed to a witness. 70
Justice Marshall further criticized the majority's lack of evidence to support the majority's contention that the "truth-seeking function" would be disrupted by allowing an attorney and
defendant to confer during a brief break in testimony.' 7 ' Injustice Marshall's opinion, the purpose of the sixth amendment
right to counsel was to aid the defendant in producing the
truth. 7 2 The dissent therefore concluded that the "truth-seeking
function" would not be disrupted by a defendant's conferring
with counsel, even if a new course of action was adopted.'7 3 Justice Marshall declared that if the truth was found to be hindered
during a short recess, it was logical to conclude that it would also
be disrupted during an overnight recess.' 7 4
The dissent also rejected the majority's argument that a defendant was constitutionally guaranteed the right to speak with
his attorney about "matters that go beyond the content of the
defendant's own testimony."' 17 5 Justice Marshall asserted that
perhaps a judge may prohibit certain trial testimony to be discussed with one's counsel at a mid-trial recess.' 7 6 The dissent
168 Id. See also id. at 606 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing "unethical
coaching" and the proper role of the attorney in the administration of justice).
169 See id. at 604 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170 Id. at 605 (Marshall,J., dissenting). The Court, aware of the defendant's atypical status in Geders, stated that "the petitioner was not simply a witness; he was also
the defendant . . . . A nonparty witness ordinarily has little, other than his own
testimony, to discuss with trial counsel; a defendant in a criminal case must often
consult with his attorney during the trial." Id. (quoting Geders v. United States,
425 U.S. 80, 88 (1976)).
171 Id.
172 Id. In an earlier opinion this term, Justice Stevens wrote:
The paramount importance of vigorous representation follows from the
nature of our adversarial system ofjustice. This system is premised on
the well tested principle that truth-as well as fairness-is "best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question." Absent
representation, however, it is unlikely that a criminal defendant will be
able adequately to test the government's case, for, as Justice Sutherland
wrote in Powell v. Alabama "[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman
has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law."
Id. (quoting Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 352 (1988)) (citations omitted).
17 Id. at 606 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 608 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 608 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall doubted the major-
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stated, however, that the sixth amendment should protect the defendant from absolute denial of access to confer with one's counsel. 177 Justice Marshall's assertion supported the claim that Perry
was denied a constitutional right when the judge precluded all
contact between the attorney and his client during a brief
recess. 178

Justice Marshall's dissent, while taking a broader view of the
right to counsel than the majority, suggested that perhaps a few
calming words from counsel to a defendant may actually increase
the production of truth. 179 The dissent embellished upon this
position by expressing that a defendant may be nervous, scared,
or unaware of the correct trial procedure.18 0 Justice Marshall's
assertion was particularly appropriate in Perry's case.'' The dissent inferred that because Perry was mildly retarded, he may not
have been aware of proper deportment and procedure. 8 2 Because the charges against Perry carried the death sentence, Justice Marshall believed that a few comforting words from Perry's
attorney may have helped Perry to tell the truth. 8 " The dissent
reasoned that due process required that the defendant be able to
of the proceedings, in order to fairly testify
appreciate the nature
4
18
in his own behalf.

ity's assumption that they will be able to distinguish testimonial discussions from
trial strategy discussions. Id. The dissent asserted that the majority neglected to
specify how, if possible, to distinguish between nontestimonial and testimonial discussions. Id. Justice Marshall further reasoned that this lack of a standard may well
"have a chilling effect on cautious attorneys, who might avoid giving advice on nontestimonial matters for fear of violating [a court order barring recess discussions of
testimonial matters]." Id. (quoting Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1512
(D.C. Cir. 1986)).
177 Id. at 608 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178 Id. Justice Marshall further pointed out that "[i]n allowing trial judges to ban
all brief recess consultations, even those including or limited to discussions regarding nontestimonial matters, the majority needlessly fires grapeshot where, even
under its own reasoning, a single bullet would have sufficed." Id. (emphasis in
original).
179 Id. at 606 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
180 Id.
181 Id. For a more detailed description of Perry's mental capacity, see id. at 606
n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 606 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also supra note 10 and accompanying
text (describing Perry's emotional and mental conditions).
183 Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 606 & n.6 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall posited that "[o]ne can only assume that the treatment the trial
judge afforded Perry during the 15-minute recess exacerbated his sense of fright or
trepidation." Id.
184 Peny 109 S. Ct. at 609 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See, e.g., United States v. Ash,
413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (the Constitution attempts to diminish the inequities in
the adversarial process). Justice Marshall pointed out that
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Acknowledging the confusion surrounding the scope of the
sixth amendment's right to counsel, Justice Marshall admonished
that the confusion should not allow the majority to interpret the
sixth amendment too narrowly. 85 The dissent described the majority's fears to be without merit, overly restrictive, and highly
overstated.' 86 The dissent concluded that one's constitutional
87
rights heavily outweigh the possibility of hindering the truth.
While the Court's inquiry regarding fairness is justified, its
conclusion is contrary to the fundamental ideals that preserve a
defendant's right to a fair trial. 18 8 To find no constitutional error
when a state forbids a defendant from conferring with counsel
because the "fairness" of the trial was not affected, seems to infer
that the sixth amendment right to counsel should only be enforced when the fairness of the trial is in question. Surely, the
framers did not intend that the sixth amendment be "result" oriented. Rather, it is more logical that the right to counsel
was
18 9
intended to be a means which justifies the ultimate end.
Varying views have been expressed with regard to restrictions placed upon a defendant to consult with counsel during a
trial recess.' 90 In the majority of these types of cases, the circuit
[tihe majority twice disserves this noble goal-by isolating the defendant at a time when counsel's assistance is perhaps most needed, and by
ignoring the stark unfairness of according prosecution witnesses the
very prerogatives denied the defendant. The Constitution does not permit this new restriction on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 609 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185

Id.

Id. at 606 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 608 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See Survey, Right to Counsel Not Violated by Judge's ProhibitingCriminal Defendant
from Conferring with Counsel Between Direct and Cross-Examination,40 S.C.L. REV. 47, 52
(1988).
189 In his majority opinion in Gideon, Justice Black contended:
Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him... The right... to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some
countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural
and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals ....
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
190 Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 598 n.2 (1989). Cf. Stubbs v. Borderkircher,
689 F.2d 1205, 1206-07 (4th Cir. 1982) (constitutional error to deprive defendant
right to confer with attorney during lunch break while defendant is testifying, but
no deprivation of sixth amendment right in this situation because defendant did
not express any desire to communicate with attorney, and no proof he would have
186
187
188
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courts have automatically reversed. 19 ' The holding in Perry v.
Leeke 192 further confuses this controversial aspect of the right to
effective assistance of counsel. By abandoning many of the circuit courts' prior holdings of per se reversal, but not overruling
the Geders decision, the Court leaves a cloud of confusion over
denial of assistance of counsel for recesses of more than fifteen
193
minutes, but less than seventeen hours.
The Supreme Court's adjudication of sixth amendment right
to counsel claims mandates uniform application of constitutional
principles. The effect of the Perry decision will inevitably lead to
a myriad of right to counsel lawsuits. The Geder's opinion, cited
by the majority, is in favor of protecting the defendant's constitutional rights.' 94 The Court's holding in Perry, however, is inconsistent with the logic set forth in Geders.195 By establishing what is
constitutional based upon arbitrary amounts of time, the Court

may deprive individuals of fundamental rights which are protected by the sixth amendment. The Court's desire to distinguish Perry from Geders is an unwarranted value judgment, lacking
a logical basis.'
The majority fails to establish where its asdone so but for the restriction), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907; Bailey v. Redman, 657
F.2d 21, 22-25 (3d Cir. 1981) (no constitutional deprivation when defendant was
barred from discussing current testimony with anyone throughout an overnight recess because there was no evidence of a desire to confer which would have occurred
but for the restriction, in addition, neither defendant nor counsel objected to the
bar order), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982); United States v. Dilapi, 651 F.2d 140,
147-49 (2d Cir. 1981) (sixth amendment violation existed when defendant was denied access to attorney during a five minute break while defendant was testifying
but no prejudice was apparent in this case), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); United
States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641, 643-45 (5th Cir. 1980) (trial court's order not to
discuss the case with counsel throughout a lunch break called during a defendant's
cross examination violates sixth amendment right to counsel); Untied States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035, 1036 (6th Cir. 1976) (restriction on client-counsel contact during a one hour recess in the middle of direct testimony, was a deprivation of
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel); Ashurst v. State, 424 So.2d 691,
691-93 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (violation of right to counsel when defendant prohibited to confer with counsel during defendant's testimony, and all recesses).
191 See Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 598 n.2.
192 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989).
193 See Survey, supra note 188, at 52.
194 See Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 599 (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80
(1976)).
195 See Survey, supra note 188, at 52.
196 See, e.g., Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 608 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In support of his
contention, Justice Marshall noted, "[b]y not even providing a practical framework
in which to answer these questions, the majority ensures that defendants, even
those in adjoining courtrooms, will be subject to inconsistent practices. Such inconsistency is untenable when a critical constitutional right is at stake." Id.
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sumptions and assertions have been drawn.' 9 7 The Court assumes the role of a "super legislature" when it begin
distinguishing fundamental rights based upon its own subjective
analysis. Strict scrutiny should be applied to this type of encroachment upon the defendant's fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. 198 As expressed in the dissent, Geders was
correctly decided, and Perry must follow it. 199 The distinction between a fifteen minute recess and a seventeen hour overnight recess is irrelevant. The holding should be based on the
constitutional right to counsel, regardless of the length of time
involved. Unfortunately, the majority's narrow holding leaves
unstructured precedent for future cases. In addressing future
right to counsel cases, the Court should develop a more concrete
system of analysis to determine when there is an infringement
upon a defendant's constitutional rights. A bright line rule of the
right to counsel at all times would remedy the discrepancies.
Arguably, the decision in Perry was motivated by the mental
capacity of the defendant and the heinous crimes involved. The
Court frowns upon rape, kidnapping, and murder because of
their violent nature. Accordingly, the opinion hints at the
Court's bias towards such types of prosecution. One wonders
what the outcome of Perry would have been had the defendant
been on trial for an offense less serious than murder. The divided Court's decision clearly indicates that the intent and scope
of the right to assistance of counsel is in need of further clarification. The majority's decision jeopardizes, if not vanquishes, the
very essence and purpose of the sixth amendment.
Susan A. Halper
197 Id. at 607 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall stated: "Once again,
the majority reasons by assertion; it offers no legal or empirical authority to buttress this proposition." Id.
198 See generally G. GuNTHER, CONSTITrrIONAL LAw 586-89 (11 th ed. 1985) (dis-

cussing equal protection). A strict scrutiny analysis will be applied by the Court to
governmental action which impairs a "fundamental right" or interest. Id. at 588.
Where the strict scrutiny test is used, the classification will only be sustained if its
purpose is to provide a compelling governmental interest. Id. In addition, there
must be a very close relationship between the means used in order to achieve the
desired ends. Id. In Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594 (1989), there does not appear to
be any governmental interest so compelling to deny the defendant his sixth amendment fundamental right to the effective assistance of counse. See id.
199 See Perry, 109 S. Ct. at 602 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

